Tag Archives: Warren Buffett

Zipcar – Time to Step on the Brakes?

19 Apr

After being a loyal lessee for six years, I turned in the keys to one of my few luxuries after the lease of my second car expired. As a resident of Manhattan, I paid the “bargain” rate of $400 per month to park the vehicle which, after 39 months, had all of 21,000 miles. When you add up my lease payment, parking and insurance, I was paying $1,500 a month before I even put the key in the ignition. Why did I effectively “put” the car back to the company? One word: Zipcar Inc. (NASDAQ: ZIP).

So you weren’t part of “friends and family” and you didn’t get allocated shares in the Zipcar IPO. Is now th time to jump in? Continue reading for the answer. Continue reading


Wells Fargo Pick-A-Pay Portfolio: Presented without Comment*

4 Mar

Some of you have may have noticed the ongoing debate regarding the Pick-a-Pay portfolio of Warren Buffett’s beloved Wells Fargo (NYSE: WFC). In order to put this horse to pasture, I present the following with no pejorative words and only a few minor comments.

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10 Things Wells Fargo Wants You to Ignore

28 Feb

It has been well documented that Warren Buffett is Wells Fargo’s biggest fan – and largest shareholder (through Berkshire Hathaway). In fact, in his annual letter to shareholders he states that WFC is likely to increase its dividend the most among his common stock holdings. Given that WFC cut its dividend after taking TARP money, his prediction should not come as a surprise.

Another interesting comment from the Oracle of Omaha was his take on Black-Scholes. He writes that the model “produces WILDLY inappropriate values when applied to long-dated options” (emphasis mine). Then he wryly states that he “would rather be approximately right than precisely wrong.” Continue reading

Why the Wells Fargo CFO Quit and Pick-A-Pay Games

10 Feb

What, exactly, would cause a highly paid executive to abruptly quit his job? The executive in question is Howard Atkins, former CFO of Wells Fargo (NYSE: WFC). In 2009, Mr. Atkins’ total compensation was $11.6 million. That was up from $4.9 million in 2009 and $5.7 million 2007 – that’s not bad living by any standard. It’s no secret that I have often been critical of WFC and their financial reporting. It’s not that I have a vendetta against the company – as a New Yorker, I don’t run across them in my every day life. I don’t own the company’s stock or options nor do I have a short position. So, why do I continue to shine a light on the company? Quite frankly, I believe the company does not receive the same level of scrutiny that its peers receive. I believe this is likely due to the fact that Berkshire Hathaway (NYSE: BRK.A) is their largest shareholder. As many of you know, investment banking is driven largely by fees received from capital raising and Mergers & Acquisitions. Buffett’s empire of portfolio companies crosses numerous sectors. Those companies, from time to time, find it necessary to utilize the services investment banks. Those services typically result in hefty fees. Why upset uncle Warren? Just a thought, but I like conspiracy theories. Continue reading

Why Berkshire Hathaway should be Broken Up: time for conglomerates to go the way of the Dodo

24 Jan

Warren Buffett’s house needs remodeling. Barron’s made a bullish case for Berkshire Hathaway (NYSE: BRK.A) this weekend touting Mr. Buffett’s sizeable, and growing, war chest. The article, quite frankly, is missing the point. BRK.A is an ugly conglomerate in need of restructuring.

The primary rationale behind the conglomerate structure is that the company will benefit from diversification. Thus, it should be better able to withstand the ups and downs of the market cycle. In addition, they should have a financing advantage over more focused but smaller firms. However, with the company’s triple-A rating now gone, some of the relative funding advantage has been lost. Recall, American International Group (NYSE: AIG) and General Electric (NYSE:GE) both had this advantage which allowed their financial subsidiaries to become market leaders – which ultimately inflicted significant pain on shareholders. Perhaps an unintended consequence of the conglomerate structure?

Over the past 10 years, BRK.A has grown at a compound annual rate of approximately 5%. This compares to purchasing a 10 year bond yielding 5.43% in January of 2001. I know the cheerleaders will say that BRK.A outperformed the S&P whose compound annual return was less than 1% over that same period, but is it the right metric of comparison?

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